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Abstract 
 
We use the recently developed nonlinear autoregressive distributed lags (NARDL) 
model to examine the pass-through of changes in crude oil prices, natural gas prices, 
coal prices and electricity prices to the CO2 emission allowance prices. This approach 
allows one to simultaneously test the short- and long-run nonlinearities through the 
positive and negative partial sum decompositions of the predetermined explanatory 
variables. It also offers the possibility to quantify the respective responses of the CO2 
emission prices to positive and negative shocks to the prices of their determinants 
from the asymmetric dynamic multipliers. We find that: (i) the crude oil prices have a 
long-run negative and asymmetric effect on the CO2 allowance prices; (ii) the falls in 
the coal prices have a stronger impact on the carbon prices in the short-run than the 
increases; (iii) the natural gas prices and electricity prices have a symmetric effect on 
the carbon prices, but this effect is negative for the former and positive for the latter. 
Policy implications are provided. 
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1. Introduction 
The atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) is the largest component of the greenhouse 
gases which cause global warming. About 72% of the greenhouse gases emitted is 
completely CO2, and thus the CO2 emissions are the major cause of global warming. 
CO2 is considered harmful to human health and has profound deleterious effects on 
the environment as a whole. 
Governments have come together to restrict human production of the 
greenhouse gases, mainly the carbon dioxide (CO2). International organizations 
have also recognized the dangers on climate change associated with the CO2 emis-
sions. About 75% of this contaminant gas’s emissions come from the use of fossil 
fuels including coal, natural gas and oil and may remain in the atmosphere for 80 
to 200 years. 
In this context, governments and financial markets have placed in the mar-
ket a price on the CO2 emissions to reduce the amount of pollution. This market-
based approach is employed to control the carbon pollution by providing economic 
incentives for achieving reductions in those emissions. In most of the cases, gov-
ernments set a limit on the amount of pollutants that can be emitted. This limit is 
allocated or sold to firms in the form of emission allowance permits which repre-
sent the right to emit a specific volume of the specified pollutants. For the green-
house gases, the largest trading program for the permits is the European Union 
Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). 
The on-going developments in the markets for the CO2 emission allowances 
have far-reaching implications for environmental policy, financial institutions and 
industries in a variety of sectors. In this article, we investigate how fluctuations in 
energy prices are passed on to the carbon emission allowance prices, viewing it 
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from the United States’ perspective, over both the short- and long-run, by using the 
newly developed  nonlinear autoregressive distributed lags (NARDL) model.  
This approach is a significant improvement over the typical univariate and 
multivariate linear econometric models prevailing in the carbon economics litera-
ture. In contrast to the traditional (linear) error-correction model, this modeling 
approach is a two-regime dynamic error-correction representation which allows 
for asymmetric responses of the CO2 allowance prices to negative and positive 
changes in energy prices. It is particularly advantageous in that reliable long-run 
inferences can be achieved by bounds tests regardless of the integration order of 
the variables in the system (Shin et al., 2014). This approach also takes into ac-
count non-linearities due to the presence of new regulations such as governments 
mandating that a sizeable part of power generation be fuelled by clean alternative 
sources of energy such as solar and wind. It is also better suited to deal with the 
impact of major discoveries in the primary energy sources such as shale gas that 
led to reshuffles in energy prices, substitution among primary fuels and caused 
some coal-fired power plants to close. Changes in the National Allocation Plans 
(NAP) in the form of revisions or cuts of national emission caps have also conse-
quences that may be sudden price jumps, spikes or phases of extreme volatility in 
the allowance prices. Furthermore, the CO2 allowance prices can be relatively high 
during periods of strong economic expansion or when new low-carbon technolo-
gies are slow in entering the market. On the other hand, during times of economic 
slumps and low prices of clean fuels, the carbon allowance prices can be low. These 
major changes may lead to asymmetry and structural changes in the relationships 
between energy prices and pollution emissions. 
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The consideration of nonlinearity and asymmetry in the price interactions 
is also of great importance because of the complexity of the economic system that 
governs the data-generating process in the energy and carbon emission markets. 
Indeed, factors such as episodes of financial turbulence, sudden policy shifts, ex-
treme events, geopolitical tensions, financial markets sophistication, and regula-
tion multiplicity may induce regime-switching behavior, asymmetric responses to 
news and leverage effects. Consequently, the price of carbon emissions is likely to 
be nonlinearly related with energy prices. 
Our research is closely linked to the strand of the literature on the determi-
nants of the CO2 emission allowance markets, in particular the study by Kim and 
Koo (2010). Using the linear ARDL model of Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran 
et al. (2001), Kim and Koo (2010) find that the price of coal is the main driver of 
the carbon allowances trading in the United States over the long-run. In the short-
run, their results indicate that changes in the prices of crude oil, coal and natural 
gas significantly affect the trading of carbon allowances. In contrast to Kim and 
Koo (2010), we use the nonlinear ARDL model and also include, in addition to the 
prices of coal, crude oil and natural gas, the price of electricity which is generated 
by a mix of fuels and can cause major energy substitution in response to regulatory 
policy changes. We also attempt to quantify the asymmetric pass-through of ener-
gy prices (negative versus positive changes) to the carbon allowance prices.  
Relying on monthly data for the period 2006-2011 where the end period is 
dictated by the availability of the coal price series, we find evidence that the crude 
oil prices have a long-run asymmetric effect on the carbon prices. This effect is 
negative and consistent with the fall in oil demand over time, which makes the 
build-up of carbon inventory less warranted. In the case of the coal prices, we also 
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uncover a negative and asymmetric relationship of these prices with the carbon 
prices in the short-run, but the linkage is stronger when the coal prices fall which 
leads to more pollution. 
As for natural gas and electricity, our findings do not reveal the presence of 
asymmetry in the relationship between the prices of  each of those energy sources 
and the CO2 allowance prices. However, although changes in the electricity price 
have a negative effect on the carbon prices over the short-run, they have a positive 
impact on the carbon prices, reflecting the presence of strong regulations, the lack 
of energy substitution and the inelastic demand in the electricity sector. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature. Section 3 introduces the empirical framework and describes the data. 
Section 4 reports the obtained results. Section 5 concludes the article. 
 
2. Brief review of the literature 
The literature on the dynamics of CO2 allowance prices and volatility has grown 
rapidly over the last decade, following the concerns over the harmful effects of 
greenhouse gases and climate change. It particularly deals with price drivers, price 
volatility structure and price discovery in the spot and futures markets for the car-
bon emission allowances. Previous works have been mainly challenged by the exis-
tence of different price regimes when analysing the European Union (EU) emission 
allowances market and the potential of nonlinear dynamics of the CO2 prices which 
are caused by frequent market imperfections, regulatory policy changes, heteroge-
neous investors and episodes of financial market instability.  
The linear and nonlinear dynamic behavior of the CO2 allowance prices has 
been analyzed by Daskalakis et al. (2005), Paolella and Taschini (2008), Seifert et 
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al. (2008) and Chevallier (2010a), among others. These studies generally find evi-
dence of jumps and regime-dependent volatility structure as well as evidence of 
spot-futures price relationships that facilitate the price discovery.1 For instance, 
Daskalakis et al. (2005) examine the spot and futures prices obtained from the Eu-
ropean Energy Exchange (EEX) in Germany and show that the spot prices of the 
CO2 emission allowances exhibit a random walk volatility behavior which can be 
captured by a jump-diffusion model. Those authors also find that market partici-
pants adopt standard no-arbitrage pricing. Paolella and Taschini (2008) use a 
GARCH approach to examine the distribution and predictability of the prices of the 
SO2 and CO2 emission allowances in accordance with the U.S. Clean Air Act 
Amendment and the EU Emission Trading Scheme, respectively. They show that a 
parametric GARCH with a generalized asymmetric t-distribution works well for 
modeling the CO2 allowance prices. Seifert et al. (2008) adopt a tractable stochastic 
equilibrium model to analyze the CO2 spot price dynamics in the EU ETS market. 
They argue that the CO2 prices do not follow any seasonal patterns and the CO2 
price process exhibits a time- and price-dependent volatility structure. Benz and 
Trück (2009) investigate the evolution of the EU allowances spot prices and show 
that the CO2 price returns exhibit nonlinear dynamics which can be reproduced by 
Markov-switching models. The study by Chevalier (2010a) emphasizes that the 
CO2 futures prices are relevant for the price discovery in the spot emission allow-
ance market.  
There is another strand of literature that focuses on the price drivers of the 
CO2 emission allowance markets. Hintermann (2010) investigates the UE allow-
                                                 
1
 Taking a different perspective, Chevalier (2010b) models the risk premia in the CO2 allowance spot and 
futures prices under the EU ETS and finds evidence of positive time-varying risk premia, which are strict-
ly higher for the post-2012 contracts than for the Phase II contracts. 
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ance price drivers around the price crash of April 2006 and highlights the role of 
fuel prices, summer temperature, and precipitation in governing the post-crash 
CO2 allowance prices. Kim and Koo (2010) examine the potential factors affecting 
the U.S. carbon allowance market and show that the price of coal is the main driver 
of the carbon allowance prices over the long-run. Moreover, changes in the prices 
of crude oil, coal and natural gas significantly affect the trading of carbon allow-
ances over the short-run. Wang et al. (2013) use an input–output structural de-
composition to analyze the driving forces behind the CO2 emissions in Beijing over 
the period 1997-2010.  Their findings indicate that the CO2 emission growth there 
is mainly driven by the production structure change and the population growth. 
However, this growth is partly offset by the CO2 emission intensity reduction and 
the decline in per capita final demand volume during the study period. 
Other studies have considered the linkages between the spot and futures 
carbon allowances markets, as well as the possible predictability involving these 
two markets. For example, Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2006) conduct an empiri-
cal examination of the relationship between the spot and futures prices in the EU 
ETS markets and find that the futures contracts lead the price discovery process of 
CO2 emission allowances. Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2009) examine the joint 
dynamics of the EU spot and futures allowance prices during Phase I and find a 
long-run relationship between the observed futures prices and the theoretical fu-
tures prices which are obtained from a cost-of-carry model. This evidence is how-
ever not consistent with the finding of Milunovich and Joyeux (2010) who reject 
the existence of a long-run relationship between the EU allowance spot and futures 
prices. In a more recent study, Arouri et al. (2012) employ a Vector Auto-
Regression (VAR) model and a Switching Transition Regression-Exponential 
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GARCH model to capture the asymmetry and nonlinearity effects in both the return 
and the volatility of the spot and futures prices of the EU emission allowances dur-
ing Phase II. The authors find that the spot and futures returns of carbon prices are 
linked in an asymmetric and nonlinear fashion. 
In an earlier study, Milunovich and Joyeux (2007) address the issues of 
market efficiency and price discovery in the EU allowance markets by applying 
Granger causality and linear cointegration tests. Their findings show that the spot 
and future allowance prices efficiently share information and jointly contribute to 
price discovery in view of the bilateral information transmission. While there is a 
long-run relationship between the futures and spot prices, the spot prices have no 
significant forecasting power for the futures prices. Rittler (2012) provides em-
pirical evidence that corroborates the works of Milunovich and Joyeux (2010) and 
Chevalier (2010a) when daily data are used, but contrasts with them when intra-
day data are used. In a related study, Daskalakis et al. (2009) use technical analysis 
rules and naïve forecasts to examine the efficiency of the EU emission allowance 
market during Phase I.  They show that the behavior of the three predominant EU 
allowance exchanges under the EU ETS (European Climate Exchange, Nord Pool 
and Powernext) is not consistent with the weak-form market efficiency. This inef-
ficient behavior is explained by the immaturity of the EU ETS, as well as by the re-
strictions imposed on the banking and short-selling of the emission allowances.  
Our study extends the previous works by examining the nonlinear and 
asymmetric pass-through of energy prices to the prices of CO2 emission allowances 
from the U.S. perspective. The empirical analysis allows for capturing the asym-
metric response of the carbon allowance prices to each of the energy prices over 
both the short- and long-run. We are also able to show the nonlinear adjustment of 
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carbon and energy prices from their initial equilibrium to their new steady state. 
With the implementation of the Acid Rain Program of the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) in the United States, the majority of the existing works has 
focused on the price behavior of the SO2 tradable emission allowances to the det-
riment of the research on the CO2 allowance prices (Ellerman and Montero, 1998; 
Schennach, 2000; Böhringer and Lange, 2005; Schleich et al., 2006). This study will 
help to pick up some of what the literature has dropped. 
 
3. Econometric methodology 
3.1. The NARDL model 
The recent Nonlinear Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag model (NARDL) proposed 
by Shin et al (2014) is used to examine the strength of the pass-through of coal 
prices, crude oil prices, electricity prices and natural gas prices into the CO2 emis-
sion allowance prices over both the short- and long-run. This methodology pre-
sents important advantages over the existing modelling techniques (such as the 
Error Correction Model (ECM), the threshold ECM, the Markov-switching ECM and 
the Smooth Transition ECM) in modeling jointly the cointegration dynamics and 
asymmetries. Besides its estimation simplicity, the NARDL model provides greater 
flexibility in relaxing the assumptions that the time-series should be integrated of 
the same order, contrary to the ECM which is binding in this sense. It also allows 
one to accurately distinguish between the absence of cointegration, linear cointe-
gration and nonlinear cointegration (Katrakilidis and Trachanas, 2012) and per-
forms better in testing for cointegration in small samples (Romilly et al., 2001). 
It is now commonly accepted that the short-run deviations of first-order in-
tegrated variables from their common long-run equilibrium can be reproduced by 
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the linear ECM developed by Granger (1981), Engle and Granger (1987) and 
Johansen (1988). The linear ECM takes the following form: 
 
1 1
2 1 1 1
1 0
2 2 2
p q
t CO t x t i t i i t t
i i
CO CO Y CO Y     
 
   
 
                             (1) 
where      refers to the CO2 emission allowance prices in logarithm and    repre-
sents one of the energy prices in logarithm (i.e. coal prices, crude oil prices, elec-
tricity prices and natural gas prices) that we consider. The symbol  denotes first-
differences. The model in Eq. (1) allows for investigating the short- and long-run 
links between the variables when these relationships are linear and symmetric. 
However, the model will be misspecified when they are nonlinear and/or asym-
metric.  
In this context, Granger and Yoon (2002) introduce the concept of hidden 
cointegration, which is detected if two time-series are not cointegrated in the con-
ventional sense, but their positive and negative sums are cointegrated with each 
other. The NARDL model of Shin et al. (2014) allows one to jointly examine the 
short- and long-run response of the CO2 emissions prices to each of the prices of 
coal, crude oil, electricity and natural gas and detects hidden cointegration. This 
methodology employs the decomposition of the exogenous variable Y into its posi-
tive and negative partial sums, i.e., 
tY
 and 
tY
 , of increases and decreases such as 
 
1 1
max ,0
t t
t j j
j j
Y Y Y 
 
      and  
1 1
min ,0
t t
t j j
j j
Y Y Y 
 
                              (2) 
Accounting for the short- and long-run asymmetries in the linear ECM 
model as presented in Eq. (1), Shin et al. (2014) extend this model to the general 
NARDL model which is expressed as follows: 
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 
1 1
1 1 1
1 0
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p q
t t t t i t i i t i i t i t
i i
CO CO Y Y CO Y Y       
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The superscripts (+) and (–) in Eq. (3) stand for the positive and negative 
partial sums decomposition as defined above. The symbols p and q denote the re-
spective lag orders for the dependent variable and the exogenous variable in the 
distributed lag part, respectively. In particular, the long-run symmetry can be 
tested by using a Wald test of the null hypothesis that   in Eq. (3). We can 
then compute the positive and negative long-run coefficients as follows: 
      
       and       
      . The short-run adjustments to the positive 
and negative shocks affecting the prices of coal, crude oil, electricity and natural 
gas are captured by the parameters i
  and i
 , respectively. The short-run sym-
metry can equally be tested by using a standard Wald test of the null hypothesis 
that i i 
   for all 0,..., 1i q  .  
Eq. (3) is reduced to the traditional (linear) ECM if both null hypotheses of 
short-run and long-run symmetry cannot be rejected. The non-rejection of either 
the long-run symmetry or the short-run symmetry will yield the cointegrating 
NARDL model with short-run asymmetry (Eq. (4)) and with long-run asymmetry 
(Eq. (5)), respectively: 
 
1 1
2 1 1
1 0
2 2 2
p q
t CO t Y t i t i i t i i t i t
i i
CO CO Y CO Y Y      
 
   
    
 
                        (4)   
1 1
2 1 1 1
1 0
2 2 2
p q
t CO t Y t Y t i t i i t i t
i i
CO CO Y Y CO Y      
 
   
    
 
                    (5) 
When asymmetry is detected in the NARDL model (either in the short-run 
or in the long-run or in both), the asymmetric responses to positive and negative 
one-unit shocks (i.e., increases or decreases) in the energy prices are respectively 
 12 
captured by the positive and negative dynamic multipliers associated with unit 
changes in Y  and Y   as follows:  
0
2h t j
h
j t
CO
m
Y






   and 
0
2h t j
h
j t
CO
m
Y






  with ,...2,1,0h         (6) 
when h ,  
     , and  
     , where     and     are the positive and the 
negative asymmetric long-run coefficients, respectively. Based on the estimated 
multipliers, we can observe the nonlinear dynamic adjustments of the two vari-
ables (CO2 emission allowance prices and either one of the prices of coal, crude oil, 
electricity and natural gas) from their initial equilibrium to their new steady state 
over time, following a shock affecting the cointegrating system. 
Overall, the NARDL model accounts for the short-run dynamics through the 
distributed lag part and the long-run dynamics via a single common cointegrating 
vector. Both parts are allowed to be asymmetric. Further, the NARDL model allows 
for combinations of I(1) and I(0) variables by making use of a bounds testing pro-
cedure for the presence of the equilibrium vector. This means that we are not con-
strained by the normal requirement of cointegrating models that all variables must 
be I(1). 
 
4. Data and empirical results 
4.1 Data 
We examine the asymmetric pass-through of the four energy prices to the CO2 al-
lowance prices from the U.S. perspective. Our data include daily time-series of the 
prices of the CO2 emission allowances, coal, crude oil, electricity and natural gas. 
The data are sourced from Datastream and cover the period from July 17, 2006 to 
November 19, 2013. The length of this sample period is dictated by the availability 
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of the coal price series. Thus, this sample enables to investigate the price interac-
tions between the prices of energy and the price of the CO2 emission allowances 
under changing market conditions. Accordingly, we are able to compare our re-
sults with those of several previous studies. 
The CO2 emission allowance price corresponds to the spot price of the Eu-
ropean Union CO2 emission allowances (EEXEUAS) accessed from the European 
Energy Exchange (EEX). These prices which are expressed in euros are converted 
into US dollars by using the WM/Reuters closing spot rates of the U.S. dollar to eu-
ro exchange rate. The crude oil price is the spot price of the benchmark West Texas 
Intermediate and is expressed in U.S. dollars per barrel (CRUDOIL). The natural gas 
price corresponds to the Henry Hub natural gas spot price which is also expressed 
in U.S. dollars per million British thermal units (NATGHEN). The coal price is the 
Coal Intercontinental Exchange API2 cost, insurance and freight Amsterdam, Rot-
terdam and Antwerp NR coal price and is expressed in U.S. dollars per metric ton 
(LMCYSPT). The electricity price corresponds to the South Path 15 Firm Peak elec-
tricity price which is expressed in U.S. dollars per megawatt hour (WSSPDPF). 
 Figure 1 displays the time-variation of the energy and carbon prices.  This 
figure shows that the energy prices behave in a similar way over the study period, 
with price peaks occurring in the middle of 2008 which preceded the onset of the 
global financial crisis. While the prices of crude oil and coal have started to recover 
from their lowest levels since mid-2009, the price of electricity had remained low 
until mid-2013. As to the natural gas price, it fluctuated around its lowest level re-
corded at the end of August 2009.  The dynamics of the carbon emission allowance 
price follow the different subperiods of the European Union Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) which started in 2005 in order to help the EU meet its targets 
 14 
under the Kyoto Protocol, i.e., 8% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from the 
1990 levels. 
Figure 1. Dynamics of energy and carbon allowance prices, 2006-2013. 
 
Crude oil 
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In Phase I from January 2005 to December 2007, the EU ETS included about 
12,000 installations, which represent close to 40% of the EU CO2 emissions. These 
installations covered energy activities (combustion installations, coke ovens and 
mineral oil refineries), mineral industry (cement clinker, ceramic bricks and glass), 
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EU allowances issued due to lobbying by firms and the consequent reduction in 
carbon emissions that took place in 2005-2006. 
Phase II, which ranges from January 2008 to December 2012, expanded the 
scope of the EU ETS as a result of three non-EU members (Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway) joining it. Moreover, the "Linking Directive" introduced the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) which produces Certified Emission Reductions 
(CERs), each of each representing the successful emissions reduction equivalent to 
one tonne of CO2 equivalent. Similarly, the Directive introduced the Joint Imple-
mentation (JI) projects which produce Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), each rep-
resenting the successful emissions reduction equivalent to one tonne of CO2 
equivalent. Despite the importance of the inclusion of aviation emissions, the ad-
verse reaction of the airline industry and countries like China, India, Russia and the 
U.S. led the EU to go ahead with its own scheme while including an exemption 
clause for countries with "equivalent measures".  
During Phase II, the CO2 emission allowances were reduced by 3% and at 
least 80 million tons of "carbon offsets" were bought. On April 27, 2012, the EU 
Emissions Trading System single registry was fully activated, including the migra-
tion of over 30,000 EU ETS accounts. In the first half of 2009, the carbon price fell 
to €13/tCO2 due to the recession, the downward revision in expectations about 
future fossil fuel prices and the disappointing outcome of the Copenhagen climate 
summit. Too low incentives for firms to reduce emissions and over-supply of per-
mits continued to negatively impact prices. Thus, in June 2012, the EU allowances 
for delivery in December 2012 traded at €6.76, a 61 percent year-on-year decline. 
Finally, in Phase III which dates January 2013 to December 2020, additional 
constraints were included on the use of the offsets, limiting the banking of allow-
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ances between Phases II and III. It consists in a move from allowances to auction-
ing and the implementation of an overall cap where allowances can be allocated to 
EU members. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and statistical properties of the en-
ergy and carbon allowance prices under consideration. It can be seen that the 
prices of crude oil, coal and electricity exhibit the highest variability over the pe-
riod, as indicated by their respective standard deviations, while those of the natu-
ral gas prices and the carbon allowances are the least volatile. All the series display 
excess kurtosis and are positively skewed, with the exception of the carbon price 
which is negatively skewed. The Jarque-Bera test for normality shows that all the 
series depart from the normal distributions, except the crude oil price. 
 
Table 1. Stochastic properties of energy and carbon allowance prices at monthly frequency. 
 Crude Oil Natural Gas Coal Electricity CO2 
Mean 84.728 5.042 97.642 51.812 7.826 
Maximum 141.060 13.280 224.000 130.500 16.830 
Minimum 40.070 1.880 54.900 25.000 0.020 
Std. dev. 19.428 2.260 31.349 21.644 5.865 
Skewness 0.004 1.299 1.557 1.385 -0.058 
Kurtosis 3.120 4.543 5.942 4.893 1.534 
JB 0.060 33.469++ 67.307++ 41.290++ 7.933+ 
PP -2.569b -3.006a -2.357b -4.532a, ++ -1.644c 
ZA -4.545 -4.865 -3.357 -5.251+ -4.301 
Notes: JB denotes the empirical statistics of the Jarque-Bera test for normality. PP is the Phillips–
Perron unit root test. ZA is the empirical statistic of the Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root test 
which is robust to structural breaks. +, and ++ indicate rejection of the null hypotheses of normality 
and unit root at the 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. (a) stands for models with trend & intercept, 
(b) for models with intercept, and (c) for models without trend nor intercept.  
 
 
We also perform the Phillips–Perron unit root test (PP) and the Zivot and 
Andrews (1992) unit root test (ZA) which takes a potential structural break into 
account. The obtained results indicate that all the price series are I(1) at the 5% 
level, except the electricity price which is stationary in levels. As noted earlier, this 
evidence does not generate statistical biases when the NARDL is used.   
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4.2 Specification testing  
Our empirical analysis involves the selection of the best fitting NARDL specifica-
tions. To do so, we estimate the symmetric and asymmetric pass-through of energy 
prices to CO2 prices using Eqs. (1) and (3), and perform the Wald test for detecting 
the short- and long-run symmetry.2 Table 2 reports the results of the Wald test. 
 
Table 2. Results of the short- and long-run symmetry tests. 
 Long-run 
LRW  Short-run SRW  Conclusion 
WTI - CO2  38.300++  
[0.000] 
3.127 
 [0.081] 
NARDL with LR 
asymmetry 
Natural gas - CO2 0.557  
[0.458] 
1.752  
[0.190] 
Symmetric ARDL 
Coal - CO2 0.185  
[0.669] 
20.750++ 
[0.000] 
NARDL with SR 
asymmetry 
Electricity - CO2 0.302  
[0.584] 
0.761  
[0.386] 
Symmetric ARDL 
Notes: The estimation is based on Eqs. (1) and (3). The table reports the results of the short- and 
long-run symmetry tests for pairs of the CO2 price and one energy price. SRW denotes the Wald test 
for short-run symmetry, which tests the null hypothesis that   
    
  in Eq. (3). LRW corresponds 
to the Wald test for long-run symmetry, which tests the null hypothesis that       in Eq. (3). The 
associated p-values are in brackets. + and ++ indicate rejection of the null hypotheses of short- and 
long-run symmetry at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
As to the pair of the Crude oil–CO2 prices, we can see that the null hypothe-
sis of long-run symmetry is clearly rejected at the 1% level, while the null of short-
run symmetry is only rejected at the 10% level. Crude oil is not used in electricity 
generation but is used heavily in transportation, which makes it different from the 
other primary fuels. Declines in oil prices during recessions limit the reduction in 
oil consumption because the income effect dominates the substitution effect which 
is small because of the high inelasticity of demand for oil. This in turn restricts the 
decline in the carbon allowance prices. On the other hand, increases in oil prices 
during booms coupled with more elastic demand would have stronger impacts on 
                                                 
2
 The optimal number of lags for the two models in Eqs. (1) and (3) is selected on the basis of the SIC 
information criterion.  
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the carbon prices. Methodologically, the finding for this pair suggests that an 
NARDL allowing for long-run asymmetry is best-suited for reproducing the dy-
namic interactions between the crude oil and carbon emission prices. This conclu-
sion is also supported by the commonly-used information criteria (AIC and BIC). 
In the case of the coal–CO2 pair, the tests only reject the short-run symme-
try, highlighting the suitability of using the NARDL in the presence of short-run 
asymmetry and long-run symmetry. This result is interesting as the “fuel of choice” 
is being affected by natural gas and renewables over time and its demand share a 
downward trend with the carbon prices over time. 
For the two remaining pairs (natural gas–CO2 and electricity gas–CO2), a 
standard symmetric ARDL is selected as both the short- and long-run symmetry 
hypotheses cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels. Natural gas is 
considered cheap and is getting more abundant, while electricity is regulated and 
relies on fuel substitution. These characteristics seem to produce symmetry as the 
prices of these energy sources and carbon prices share a common path. 
Overall, our findings show that the pass-through mechanisms are not alike 
across the pairs of the energy and carbon prices we consider, and that imposing 
the linear symmetric pass-through models to characterise their relationship leads 
to misspecification in two out of four cases. When reviewing the existing empirical 
literature on price asymmetries in commodities from 38 studies in terms of 
econometric models, type of asymmetries and empirical findings, Frey and Manera 
(2007) find that half of the past studies report evidence of asymmetry, five of them 
document symmetry and the remaining studies report mixed results. More specifi-
cally, the authors highlight that price asymmetries are typically found in energy 
markets (such as oil and petroleum products) and reflect either a monopolistic 
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behaviour (Brown and Yucel, 2000) or market shocks, i.e. events or rumours that 
significantly change the actual or expected supply or demand (General Accounting 
Office, 2003). These sources of energy asymmetry seem to lead to asymmetry with 
the carbon prices in certain cases. 
 
4.3 Pass-through of energy prices to CO2 emissions prices 
Table 3 provides a summary of the estimation results of the best-fitting NARDL 
specifications for the four pairs of the energy and carbon allowance prices. We find 
evidence of significant short-run and long-run dynamics for all four models. The 
Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test for serial correlation and the ARCH test 
for conditional heteroscedasticity, applied to the estimated residuals, indicate that 
our models are correctly specified for all pairs, except for the crude oil–CO2 where 
residuals exhibit significant autocorrelation at the 5% level. 
The results for the crude oil-CO2 pair show that there is evidence of long-
run asymmetric effects of the crude oil prices on the carbon emission prices. The 
asymmetric long-run coefficients (      and      ) are negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that oil price increases and decreases reduce 
the price of carbon allowances in the long-run. This is in line with the observation 
of a somewhat downward trend in the carbon allowance prices over the period 
under study as a consequence of the decline in the oil and energy demand, which 
reduces the need for carbon inventory build-ups. Similarly, it is close in spirit with 
the work of Balabanoff (1993), who shows that although the symmetry tests are 
never rejected when it comes to the total cumulative effect of crude oil prices on 
retail prices, the persistence of crude price variations is notably asymmetric. Our 
findings are also in accordance with Hammoudeh et al. (2013) who use a VECM 
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model and uncover a negative relationship between the price of crude oil and the 
price of CO2 allowance emissions over the long-run. 
As to the natural gas-CO2 pair, the symmetric ARDL is the best-suited model 
to identify the pass-through effects of natural gas prices to carbon prices. The long-
run coefficient (       ) specifying the equilibrium relationship between the natu-
ral gas and carbon allowance prices is also negative and significant at the 1% level. 
This evidence is consistent with the negative effect of natural gas prices on the 
carbon emission prices over the long-run. More specifically, an increase in the 
price of natural gas lowers its consumption and, thus, reduces the price of the CO2 
emission allowance. The same result is found in the short-run.  
The NARDL with short-run asymmetry is selected for the coal-CO2 pair. We 
find evidence of a negative and marginal impact (significant at the 10% level) of 
coal prices on the carbon allowance prices. The coal prices also impact asymmetri-
cally the carbon prices in the short-run (      
  versus       
 ), particularly for 
the lags from 1 to 4. However, the effects are much more pronounced when the 
coal price falls. Kim and Koo (2010) also find evidence of a negative long-run equi-
librium between the coal and CO2 allowance prices in the United States. Moreover, 
short-term changes in the price of coal significantly affect the trading of carbon 
allowances. However, the empirical framework used by the authors is not able to 
detect the asymmetric (negative versus positive) short-term effects of the coal 
prices on the CO2 allowance prices. 
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Table 3. Pass-through of energy prices to carbon emission prices. 
Crude oil – CO2 Natural gas – CO2 Coal – CO2 Electricity – CO2 
NARDL with LR asym-
metry 
Symmetric ARDL 
NARDL with SR asym-
metry 
Symmetric ARDL 
       -0.234** 
(0.050) 
       -0.135** 
(0.048) 
       0.112* 
(0.048) 
       -0.216** 
(0.062) 
      
  -1.665** 
(0.427) 
          -0.740* 
(0.295) 
        0.673* 
(0.270) 
         -1.519** 
(0.465) 
      
  -2.294** 
(0.515) 
        0.027 
(0.107) 
        -0.568** 
(0.121) 
        0.026 
(0.111) 
        -0.093 
(0.106) 
         -0.909 v 
(0.480) 
        -0.212v 
(0.123) 
        -0.863* 
(0.386) 
        -0.093 
(0.106) 
           -0.162 
(0.467) 
        -0.088 
(0.099) 
          0.699 
(0.493) 
        -0.013 
(0.107) 
Constant -0.371* 
(0.175) 
        -0.295** 
(0.099) 
          1.016* 
(0.483) 
        0.032 
(0.104) 
          -0.337** 
(0.101) 
          -0.059 
(0.471) 
        0.004 
(0.107) 
        
  0.737 
(1.363) 
          0.011 
(0.420) 
      -0.707 
(0.848) 
        
  0.977 
(1.255) 
Constant -0.644** 
(0.219) 
        
 
1.280 
(0.927) 
          
  -2.147 
(1.391) 
  
Constant -0.815** 
(0.222) 
          
  3.344** 
(1.187) 
  
            
  1.054 
(1.338) 
  
            
  -4.720** 
(1.262) 
  
            
  1.343 
(1.366) 
  
            
  -6.978** 
(1.359) 
  
            
  2.937* 
(1.278) 
  
            
  -9.163** 
(1.646) 
  
    Constant -1.073** 
(0.242) 
  
      -7.108**         -5.466***       -6.016v        -7.042** 
      -9.794**       
AIC 178.3603 AIC 191.6395 AIC 130.9125 AIC 182.9826 
SIC 204.8342 SIC 206.3656 SIC 174.2334 SIC 204.7521 
B-G (12) 2.514+ B-G (12) 0.356 B-G (12) 1.001 B-G (12) 0.445 
ARCH 5.575 ARCH 1.991 ARCH 2.930 ARCH 2.448 
Notes: The table reports the estimation results of the best-suited NARDL specifications for pairs of 
energy and carbon emission prices.             indicates the long-run effect of a specific energy 
price (Y) on CO2 prices.       
       and        
       are the asymmetric long-run coeffi-
cients. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. B-G (12), and ARCH(12) refer to the empirical statis-
tics of the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation, and the Engle (1982) test for conditional 
heteroscedasticity, both applied to residuals with 12 lags. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. v indicates significance at the 10% level. + indicates rejection of the null 
hypotheses of autocorrelation and no remaining ARCH effects at the 5% level.  
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Similar to the case of the natural gas-carbon prices pair, the symmetric 
ARDL model is also selected for reproducing the interactions between the electric-
ity and carbon prices. The evidence suggests that increases in the price of electric-
ity reduce the carbon prices in the long-run, as the estimated coefficient (      ) is 
negative and significant at the 1% level. There is also some empirical support to 
the idea that carbon prices increase following a rise in the electricity price in the 
short-run. This positive, short-run relationship between the electricity prices and 
the carbon prices reflects the strong regulations on electricity prices and the ine-
lastic demand for electricity (Green, 1999; Ciarreta and Espinosa, 2012), which 
makes the degree of substitution between electricity and other sources of energy 
to be low in the short-run. 
 
4.4 Asymmetric adjustment paths 
We now turn to the dynamic multipliers showing the patterns of dynamic asym-
metric adjustments of the carbon allowance price from its initial equilibrium to the 
new steady state in the long-run, following a unit shock (negative or positive) af-
fecting a specific energy price. The predicted dynamic multipliers for the nonlinear 
adjustment of the CO2 prices to the shock in the price of crude oil, coal, natural gas 
and electricity are displayed in Figure 2. These multipliers are estimated based on 
the four best-fitting NARDL specifications that we report in Table 3. The positive 
(blue dotted line) and negative (red dotted line) change curves show the asymmet-
ric adjustment to positive and negative shocks at a given forecast horizon, respec-
tively. The asymmetry curve (green line), which is the linear combination of the 
dynamic multipliers associated with positive and negative shocks, is plotted to-
gether with its lower and upper bands at the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 2. Cumulative asymmetric adjustments of CO2 prices to energy prices. 
 
Crude oil – CO2 (NARDL with LR asymmetry) 
 
Natural gas - CO2 (Symmetric ARDL) 
 
Coal - CO2 (NARDL with SR asymmetry) 
 
Electricity - CO2 (Symmetric ARDL) 
 
The computed dynamic multipliers confirm the existence of three different 
pass-through mechanisms from energy prices to carbon allowance prices. First, the 
adjustment dynamics is linear for the cases of the natural gas–CO2 price pair and 
the electricity–CO2 price pair. It is also very similar in terms of adjustment patterns 
and magnitude. We can also see that that the CO2 price adjustments are relatively 
quick and strong over the first 20 months after the occurrence of the shock; then, 
they stabilize until the end of the forecast period.  
Second, the dynamic multiplier computed from the best-suited model for 
the crude oil-CO2 price pair provides evidence of a strong nonlinear adjustment of 
the carbon allowance price to changes in the price of crude oil. However, this 
asymmetric crude oil pass-through is the strongest among the various energy price 
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transmission effects and is dominated by the effects of negative oil price changes 
and. It takes about 18 months to converge to the long-run multipliers.  
Third, as to the coal-CO2 price pair, the adjustment pattern is relatively 
more complex, albeit asymmetric and dominated by the effect of negative changes 
in the price of coal. Indeed, while the cumulative price responses are positive and 
significant, the impact of the positive changes in the price of coal causes a positive 
reaction of the carbon price up to 2 months after the shock strikes. This reaction is 
then followed by a negative response between months 3 and 12 after the shock, 
and finally by a positive reaction from the 13th month onwards. The inversed pat-
tern is observed for the impact of the negative changes in the price of coal. The 
new equilibrium state is reached about 33 months since the occurrence of coal 
price shock.  
 
4.5 Robustness check 
To examine the robustness of our previous results, we also estimate the symmetric 
and asymmetric NARDL models for our four pairs of energy and carbon allowance 
prices by using price data at the daily frequency. 
Table 4 reports the results of the Wald test on the short- and long-run 
symmetry for the best-suited model of each pair. Moreover, Table 5 presents the 
estimated results of the corresponding best-suited NARDL models. The results of 
the Breusch-Godfrey LM and Engle (1982) tests indicate that all the models using 
daily data are correctly specified as there is no evidence of serial correlation and 
remaining ARCH effects. These results generally highlight the robustness of the 
monthly estimates. 
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Table 4. Results of the short- and long-run symmetry tests (daily data). 
 Long-run 
LRW  Short-run SRW  Conclusion 
Crude oil - CO2  5.013+  
[0.025] 
0.266 
 [0.606] 
NARDL with LR 
asymmetry 
Natural gas - CO2 0.575  
[0.449] 
0.038  
[0.846] 
Symmetric ARDL 
Coal - CO2 3.447  
[0.064] 
0.109  
[0.742] 
Symmetric ARDL 
Electricity - CO2 0.024  
[0.876] 
0.182  
[0.670] 
Symmetric ARDL 
Notes: The estimation is based on Eqs. (1) and (3). This table reports the results of the short- and 
long-run symmetry tests for the pairs of the CO2 price and one energy price. SRW denotes the Wald 
test for short-run symmetry, which tests the null hypothesis that   
    
  in Eq. (3). LRW  corre-
sponds to the Wald test for the long-run symmetry, which tests the null hypothesis that      in 
Eq. (3). The associated p-values are given in brackets. + and ++ indicate the rejection of the null hy-
potheses of short- and long-run symmetry at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5. Pass-through of energy prices to carbon emission prices (daily data). 
Crude oil - CO2 Natural gas - CO2 Coal - CO2 Electricity - CO2 
NARDL with LR asym-
metry 
Symmetric ARDL 
NARDL with SR 
asymmetry 
Symmetric ARDL 
       -0.004** 
(0.001) 
       -0.004 * 
(0.002) 
       -0.003** 
(0.001) 
       -0.005* 
(0.002) 
      
  -0.0011* 
(0.0005) 
          -0.008 
(0.005) 
        -0.0001 
(0.0003) 
         -0.0014* 
(0.006) 
      
  -0.0012** 
(0.0005) 
        -0.002 
(0.023) 
        -0.002 
(0.023) 
        -0.0017 
(0.023) 
        -0.001 
(0.023) 
        -0.045v 
(0.023) 
        -0.044v 
(0.023) 
        -0.045v 
(0.023) 
        -0.048* 
(0.0.23) 
        0.014 
(0.023) 
        0.013 
(0.023) 
        0.013 
(0.023) 
        0.010 
(0.0.23) 
        0.045v 
(0.023) 
        0.045v 
(0.023) 
        0.045v 
(0.023) 
        0.044v 
(0.023) 
         -0.020v 
(0.044) 
       0.004 
(0.004) 
        -0.001 
(0.001) 
        -0.004 
(0.023) 
           -0.009 
(0.044) 
         -0.001 
(0.004) 
          0.001 
(0.001) 
      0.018** 
(0.004) 
           -0.049* 
(0.044) 
Constant 0.019 
(0.018) 
Constant -0.007 
(0.016) 
        
 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
Constant -0.002 
(0.017) 
    
Constant -0.002 
(0.018) 
      
      -0.247*         -1.873v       -0.056        -0.258 
      -0.260*       
AIC 1612.880 AIC 1628.814 AIC 1633.023 AIC 1627.763 
SIC 1673.925 SIC 1684.315 SIC 1682.974 SIC 1677.614 
B-G(12) 0.977 B-G(12) 1.918 B-G(12) 1.033 B-G(12) 1.019 
ARCH  9.127 ARCH 8.574 ARCH 11.578 ARCH 7.963 
Notes: This table reports the detailed estimation results of the best-suited NARDL specifications for 
pairs of energy and carbon emission prices.             indicates the long-run effect of a spe-
cific energy price (Y) on CO2 prices.       
       and        
       are the asymmetric 
long-run coefficients. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. B-G (12), and ARCH(12) refer to the 
empirical statistics of the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation, and the Engle (1982) test 
for conditional heteroscedasticity, both applied to the residuals with 12 lags.  * and ** denote signifi-
cance at the 5%, and 1% levels respectively. v indicates significance at the 10% level. + indicates the 
rejection of the null hypotheses of autocorrelation and no remaining ARCH effects at the 5% level. 
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Globally, the results for daily data are similar to those presented in Tables 2 
and 3. Two notable differences can be observed. First, the pair of the coal and car-
bon prices is now best described by a symmetric ARDL instead of the NARDL with 
short-run asymmetry for the monthly data. As a result, three out of the four models 
are linear when the daily data are used. Second, the price interactions are much 
less intensive and significant than those we observe for the monthly data. These 
results are not surprising given that the impacts of energy prices on carbon allow-
ance prices are generally not immediate. The reason is that industries and corpora-
tions take time to adjust their production levels in response to changes in energy 
prices, as well as their CO2 emission quotas. Thus, the models estimated with the 
monthly data are more relevant for both investment and policy purposes in the 
carbon emission markets. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The market dynamics of the CO2 emission allowance prices have important envi-
ronmental policy implications, but have also gained a renewed relevance for the 
financial sector in recent years. In this article, we assess the relationship between 
the carbon prices and four energy prices in the U.S. through the lenses of a nonlin-
ear autoregressive distributed lags (NARDL) model.  By doing so, we are able to 
capture the asymmetric responses of the CO2 allowance prices to negative and 
positive changes in the energy prices and both over the short- and the long-run.  
Using monthly data for the period 2006-2011, we find that the crude oil 
prices have long-run asymmetric effects on the carbon emission prices. This im-
pact is negative in line with the trend decline in the oil and energy demand in the 
United States, which makes the carbon inventory build-ups less stringent. 
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As for the natural gas prices, the empirical evidence suggests that although 
an increase in the prices lowers both the consumption of natural gas in the short-
run and in the long-run (thereby, leading to a fall in the prices of the CO2 allowance 
emissions), this effect is rather consistent with a symmetric pass-through. 
Regarding the responses of the carbon prices to the coal prices, we uncover 
a negative, asymmetric and significant relationship in the short-run, but the effects 
of changes in the coal prices are much more pronounced in the case of a fall than 
when the prices go up.  
Finally, in the case of the electricity-carbon prices pair, our model corrobo-
rates the existence of a symmetric link, which is positive in the short-run. This em-
phasizes the lack of substitution between electricity and other sources of energy 
over such time window, as a result of strong regulations and inelastic demand in 
the electricity sector. 
From a policy perspective, our findings highlight that energy price volatility 
has a significant impact on the CO2 allowance prices. This effect takes place not 
only in the short-run, but also over the long-run. Moreover, it is typically asymmet-
ric in the case of the crude oil and coal prices. This is naturally important, as car-
bon price volatility might, in turn, be an impediment to R&D investment in clean 
energy technologies and renewable energy sources. 
Thus, policy measures aimed at reducing the volatility of CO2 allowance 
emission prices and, thus, dampening the effects of changes in energy prices can 
prove fruitful along these lines. For instance, by imposing limits on firms’ banking 
emissions allowances during periods when the allowance price is low, and borrow-
ing allowances when the price is high, the costs of carbon emissions can be re-
duced in a substantial manner. Similarly, safety valves, where the government 
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steps in to supply additional allowances to the market if the allowance price hits a 
ceiling or trigger level can help stabilize the price of carbon emissions. Addition-
ally, price collars which restrain price swings by creating a price floor or a price 
ceiling and operate by providing additional allowances at a predetermined price 
can mitigate the negative carbon price volatility. Therefore, it provides a boost to 
the investment in renewable energies.  
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